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Abstract
We consider an adverse selection model in which the agent can gather private infor-
mation before the principal oﬀers the contract. There are two scenarios. In scenario I,
information gathering is a hidden action, while in scenario II, the principal observes
the agent’s information gathering decision. We study how the two scenarios diﬀer
with respect to the agent’s expected rent, the principal’s expected profit, and the
expected total surplus. In particular, it turns out that the principal may be better
oﬀ when the agent’s information gathering decision is a hidden action.
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1 Introduction
Agency models with precontractual private information play a central role in con-
tract theory.1 While in standard adverse selection models the information structure
is exogenously given, more recently some authors have accounted for endogenous in-
formation structures.2 The contributions to the literature on information gathering
diﬀer in several respects. In particular, some authors (e.g., Kessler 1998) assume that
the information gathering decision is observable, while others (e.g., Crémer, Khalil,
and Rochet, 1998) assume that it is a hidden action. Hence, it is interesting to inves-
tigate the eﬀects of observability of information acquisition in a unified framework.
Is the agent better oﬀ if information gathering is a hidden action? Is the principal
better oﬀ if she can observe whether the agent has gathered private information?
In Section 2, we introduce a simple adverse selection model in which costly infor-
mation gathering before the contract is oﬀered may be pursed for rent seeking pur-
poses only, since it is commonly known that it is always ex post eﬃcient to trade.3 We
consider two scenarios. In the first scenario (Section 3), the principal cannot observe
whether the agent has spent resources to gather information. In the second scenario
(Section 4), the principal can observe the agent’s information gathering decision. In
Section 5, we analyze how the agent’s expected rent, the principal’s expected profit,
and the expected total surplus diﬀer between the two scenarios.
2 The model
Consider a principal and an agent, both of whom are risk-neutral. The principal
wants the agent to produce the quantity  ∈ [0 1] of a specific good. The principal’s
return is  and the agent’s production costs are .
At date 0, nature draws the cost parameter . While both parties know that the
distribution of  ∈ { } is given by  = { = }, at date 0 no one knows the
realization of . At date 1, the agent decides whether ( = 1) or not ( = 0) he wants
1See the seminal contributions by Myerson (1981), Baron and Myerson (1982), and Maskin and
Riley (1984).
2For a survey, see Bergemann and Välimäki (2006).
3 Information gathering is also a strategic rent-seeking activity in Crémer and Khalil (1992, 1994)
and Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998). While Crémer and Khalil (1994), Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet
(1998), and Kessler (1998) also assume that information gathering can occur before the contract is
oﬀered, some authors have studied models in which information gathering can occur after the contract
is oﬀered but before it is accepted (see Crémer and Khalil, 1992 and Hoppe and Schmitz, 2010). Note
that in the latter case observability of information gathering is irrelevant.
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to incur information gathering costs   0 to privately learn the realization of his
production costs.4 At date 2, the principal oﬀers a contract to the agent. At date
3, the agent decides whether to reject the contract (so that the principal’s payoﬀ is
0 and the agent’s payoﬀ is −) or whether to accept it. If the agent accepts the
contract, at date 4 production takes place and the principal makes the contractually
specified transfer payment  to the agent. Then the principal’s payoﬀ is  −  and
the agent’s payoﬀ is − − .
We assume that     . Thus, it is common knowledge that  = 1 is
the first-best trade level, regardless of the state of nature. This implies that costly
information gathering is an unproductive rent-seeking activity only.
We will compare two scenarios. In scenario I, the principal cannot observe the
agent’s information gathering decision . In contrast, in scenario II the principal
observes the agent’s decision  (while she can never observe the realization of ).
3 Scenario I
In scenario I, the principal cannot observe whether the agent has gathered informa-
tion. Let  ∈ [0 1] denote the probability with which the agent gathers information
at date 1.
Consider first the principal’s contract oﬀer. Suppose the principal believes the
agent has gathered information with probability . According to the revelation prin-
ciple, the principal can confine her attention to direct mechanisms [, , , , ,
] to maximize her expected payoﬀ
[(− ) + (1− )(− )] + (1− )(− ) (1)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 − [] ≥  − [] ()
 − [] ≥  − [] ()
4We thus consider the same information gathering technology as Crémer and Khalil (1992, 1994)
and Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998). In contrast, Kessler (1998) studies a model in which the agent
chooses information gathering expenditures that determine the probability with which he becomes
informed.
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the participation constraints
 −  ≥ 0 ()
 −  ≥ 0 ()
 − [] ≥ 0 ()
and the feasibility constraints  ∈ [0 1],  ∈ [0 1], and  ∈ [0 1].
Observe that the participation constraint () of the low-cost type is redundant,
as it is implied by () and (). Similarly, the participation constraint () is
redundant because it is implied by () and (). Moreover, note that the incen-
tive compatibility constraints () and () imply the monotonicity constraint
 ≥ , while similarly () and () imply  ≥ .
Ignore for a moment the incentive compatibility constraints (), (), and
(), which will turn out to be satisfied by our solution. It is then easy to see that
() must be binding; i.e., it is optimal for the principal to set
 =  (2)
because otherwise we could increase the principal’s expected profit by decreasing 
without violating any of the remaining constraints. Furthermore, () must be
binding, so that it is optimal for the principal to set
 = ( −[]) + [] (3)
because otherwise she could decrease  without violating any of the remaining con-
straints. Observe that (2) and (3) together with the monotonicity constraint  ≥ 
imply that the right-hand side of () is larger than the right-hand side of ().
Thus, it is optimal for the principal to set
 = ( −[]) + ([]− ) + , (4)
so that () is binding. It is straightforward to check that the omitted constraints
(), (), and () are indeed satisfied if (2), (3), (4), and  ≤  ≤  hold.
Hence, the principal’s problem can be simplified. She chooses  ∈ [0 1],  ∈
[0 1], and  ∈ [0 1] in order to maximize her expected profit
[(− )]
+[−[]− (([]− ) +−[])]
+[(1− )(−[])− ( −[])] (5)
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subject to the monotonicity constraint
 ≤  ≤ . (6)
The payments , , and  are given by (2), (3), and (4).
To solve the simplified problem, note that it is optimal for the principal to set
 = 1, since ( − ) ≥ 0. Moreover, the coeﬃcient of  is strictly positive
whenever
  ˆ() := −[]([]− ) +−[]  (7)
Note that 0  ˆ()  1. The coeﬃcient of  is strictly positive whenever
  ¯() :=  −[]
(1− )(−[])  (8)
where ¯()  0.
Hence, it is easy to verify that in order to maximize her expected profit (5) subject
to the monotonicity constraint (6), the principal sets  and  as displayed in Table 1.
  ¯()  = ¯()   ¯()
  ˆ()  =  = 1  ∈ [0 1],  = 1  = 0,  = 1
 = ˆ()  =  = 1  ∈ [0 1],  ∈ [ 1]  = 0,  ∈ [0 1]
  ˆ()
 =  = 1 if −   (− )
 =  ∈ [0 1] if −  = (− )
 =  = 0 if −   (− )
 =  = 0  =  = 0
Table 1. The principal’s choice of  and  depending on .
Consider now the agent’s behavior. Suppose first that in equilibrium the agent
always gathers information, so that  = 1  ˆ(). Then according to Table 1, the
principal would set  =  =: . Yet, if the agent always gathers information, his
expected payoﬀ would then be given by (−)+(1−)(−)− = (−[])−,
while his expected payoﬀ would be  − [] = ( − []) if he does not gather
information. Hence,  = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Suppose next the agent never gathers information, so that  = 0. Then   ˆ()
and   ¯(), so that according to Table 1 the principal would set  = 0,  = 1. If
the agent gathers information, his expected payoﬀ is ( − )−  = ([]− )− ,
while his expected payoﬀ if he does not gather information is  −[] = 0. Thus, if
 ≥ ([]− ), then we have found the equilibrium. In contrast, if   ([]− ),
then  = 0 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
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Taken together, if   ([] − ), then in equilibrium the agent gathers infor-
mation with probability  ∈ (0 1). This means that the agent must be indiﬀerent
between gathering and not gathering information, so that ( − ) + (1 − )( −
)−  =  − [] must hold, which using (2), (3), and (4) simplifies to
 =  − ([]− )  (9)
Observe that (9) is equivalent to  −  = ([]−) . Since 0    ([]− ),
this implies that in equilibrium  −  ∈ (0 1) must hold. Inspection of Table 1
shows that if   ¯() or   ˆ(), then  −  = 0. Moreover, if   ˆ() and
  ¯(), then −  = 1. Hence, in these cases the equilibrium conditions cannot
be satisfied, so that there are only three cases left.
• If  = ˆ()  ¯(), the principal sets  = 0 and  = ([]−) .
• If  = ¯()  ˆ(), the principal sets  = 1− ([]−) and  = 1.
• If  = ˆ() = ¯(), there are multiple equilibria. Specifically, the principal
may set  ∈ [0 1 − ([]−) ] and  =  + ([]−) . Since the principal
makes the same expected profit in all these equilibria, we assume that she oﬀers
the contract that is the best one for the agent, which is  = 1− ([]−) and
 = 1.
Note that there exists a cut-oﬀ value ˜, which is defined by ˆ(˜) = ¯(˜).5
Proposition 1 Consider scenario I.
(i) If  ≥ ([]− ), then in equilibrium the agent does not gather information,
the principal’s expected profit is −[], and the agent’s expected rent is 0.
(ii) If   ([] − ), there are two cases. If   ˜, the agent gathers infor-
mation with probability ˆ(), the principal’s expected profit is ˆ()(− ), and the
agent’s expected rent is 0. If  ≥ ˜, the agent gathers information with probabil-
ity ¯(), the principal’s expected profit is  − , and the agent’s expected rent is
 −[]− 1− .
5 It is straightforward to check that ˆ() is strictly increasing in , while ¯() is strictly decreas-
ing. Moreover, ˆ()  ¯() and lim→∞ ¯() = 0. Hence, there exists a unique ˜   such that
ˆ()  ¯() whenever   ˜, while ˆ()  ¯() whenever   ˜.
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4 Scenario II
In scenario II, the principal can observe whether at date 1 the agent has invested  in
information gathering. Suppose first the agent has not gathered information. Then
at date 2 the principal oﬀers the contract  = 1,  = [], which the uninformed
agent accepts since his expected production costs are covered. Thus, the principal
obtains the expected first-best surplus −[], while the agent’s expected payoﬀ is
zero.
Next, suppose that the agent has gathered information. When the principal oﬀers
the contract, she knows that the agent has private information about his costs, so
that she faces a standard adverse selection problem. The principal oﬀers the menu
[, , , ] that maximizes her expected profit [ − ] + (1 − )[ − ]
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints − ≥ − and − ≥
 −  and the participation constraints  −  ≥ 0 and  −  ≥ 0. As is
well known (see e.g. Laﬀont and Martimort, 2002), only the incentive compatibility
constraint of the low-cost type and the participation constraint of the high-cost type
are binding, so that it is optimal for the principal to set  = 1,  = {−≥(−)},
 = +(− ),  = . Hence, if −  ≥ (− ), the principal’s expected
payoﬀ is  −  and the agent’s expected payoﬀ is  − []. If  −   ( − ),
the principal’s expected payoﬀ is [− ] and the agent’s expected payoﬀ is 0.
Finally, consider the agent’s decision whether to gather information. If −  ≥
(− ), the agent gathers information whenever  ≤ −[]. Otherwise, he never
gathers information.
Proposition 2 Consider scenario II. Let ˆ be defined by ˆ−  = (ˆ− ). If  ≥
ˆ and  ≤  − [], the agent gathers information. The principal’s expected profit
is  −  and the agent’s expected rent is  − [] − . Otherwise, the agent does
not gather information, the principal’s expected profit is  − [], and the agent’s
expected rent is 0.
5 Comparison of the scenarios
We now analyze how the observability of information gathering aﬀects the principal’s
expected profit, the agent’s expected rent, and the expected total surplus. Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 imply the following result, which is illustrated in Figure 1.6
6One can check that ˆ(ˆ)  ¯(ˆ), so that ˜  ˆ must hold.
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Proposition 3 (i) Suppose   ˜ and   ([]− ). Then the agent’s expected
rent is zero regardless of the prevailing scenario, but observability of information
gathering increases the principal’s expected profit and thus the expected total surplus.
(ii) Suppose ˜ ≤   ˆ and   ([]− ). Then observability of information
gathering decreases the agent’s expected rent and it increases the principal’s expected
profit as well as the expected total surplus.
(iii) Suppose  ≥ ˆ. If   ([] − ), then observability of information
gathering increases the agent’s expected rent but it does not aﬀect the principal’s
expected profit, so that it increases the expected total surplus. If ([] − ) ≤  ≤
 − [], observability of information gathering increases the agent’s expected rent
and it decreases the principal’s expected profit as well as the expected total surplus.
(iv) Otherwise, the principal extracts the first-best expected total surplus in both
scenarios.
As one might have expected, the principal is typically (weakly) better oﬀ if she can
observe the agent’s information gathering decision. Yet, there are also circumstances
under which observability of information gathering reduces the principal’s expected
profit. This happens if the return  is suﬃciently large and the information gathering
costs  are at an intermediate level. For large values of , the principal has a strong
interest to trade. Hence, when she observes that the agent is informed, she will make
an oﬀer that the agent accepts regardless of his type. Thus, if information gathering
is observable, then from the agent’s point of view information gathering has the
additional advantage that it can influence the principal’s oﬀer, which is not the case
if it is unobservable. Hence, for intermediate values of the information gathering
costs , the agent still gathers information when it is observable, while he remains
uninformed when information gathering is unobservable. As a consequence, when 
is large and  is at an intermediate level, the principal must leave an information
rent to the agent when information gathering is observable, while she can extract the
expected first-best surplus from the uninformed agent when information gathering is
unobservable.7
7The result that observability of information gathering may reduce the principal’s expected profit
and increase the agent’s expected rent may also hold in a model with more than two states. For
example, suppose that  ∈ {  }. If  = 30 { = } = 04  = 50 { = } = 02
 = 60  = 100 and  = 10, then one can show that the principal extracts the expected first-best
surplus (54) in scenario I, while her expected payoﬀ is only 40 in scenario II. The agent’s expected
rent is 4 in scenario II, while he obtains no rent in scenario I. (The calculation of the example is
available from the author upon request.)
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Supplementary material:
An example with three types (cf. footnote 7 of the paper)
1. The model
We consider the same model as in the paper except that now there are
three diﬀerent cost types. Specifically, we assume that the distribution of  ∈
{  } is given by  = { = } and  = { = }
2. Scenario I: Unobservable information gathering
Suppose the principal believes that the agent has gathered information with
probability . Again we use direct mechanisms to solve the principal’s problem;
i.e. she maximizes her expected payoﬀ
[(−)+(− )+(1−−)(− )]+(1−)(− ) (1)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 − [] ≥  − [] ()
 − [] ≥  − [] ()
 − [] ≥  − [] ()
the participation constraints
 −  ≥ 0 ()
 −  ≥ 0 ()
 −  ≥ 0 ()
 − [] ≥ 0 ()
and the feasibility constraints  ∈ [0 1],  ∈ [0 1],  ∈ [0 1], and  ∈ [0 1].
i
Solving this optimization problem leads to tedious case distinctions. How-
ever, consider the following example:  = 30  = 04  = 50  = 02
 = 60  = 100 and  = 10.
Observe that the participation constraint () of the low-cost type is re-
dundant, as it is implied by () and (). Similarly, the participation
constraint () is redundant because it is implied by () and ()
The participation constraint () which is implied by () and () is
redundant as well. Moreover, note that the incentive compatibility constraints
() and () imply the monotonicity constraint  ≥ . Similarly, since
  [] holds in the example, () and () imply  ≥ . Moreover,
() and () imply  ≥ .
Now ignore for a moment the incentive compatibility constraints (),
(), (), and (), () as well as () which will turn out to be
satisfied by our solution. It is then easy to see that () must be binding;
i.e., it is optimal for the principal to set
 =  (2)
because otherwise she could increase her expected profit by decreasing  with-
out violating any of the remaining constraints. Furthermore, () must be
binding, so that it is optimal for the principal to set
 = ( − ) +  (3)
because otherwise she could decrease  without violating any of the remaining
constraints. Observe that (2) and (3) together with the monotonicity constraint
 ≥  imply that in our example the right-hand side of () is larger than
the right-hand side of (). Thus, it is optimal for the principal to set
 = ( − ) + ( −[]) + [] (4)
so that () is binding. Similarly, (2), (3), and (4) together with the monotonic-
ity constraint  ≥  ≥  imply that the right-hand side of () is larger
than both the right-hand side of () and the right-hand side of (). Thus,
it is optimal for the principal to set
 = ( − ) + ( −[]) + ([]− ) + , (5)
so that () is binding.
Hence, the principal’s problem can be simplified. She chooses  ∈ [0 1],
 ∈ [0 1],  ∈ [0 1], and  ∈ [0 1] in order to maximize her expected profit
ii
[(− )]
+[(1− )(−[])− ([]− )]
+[(− ) + (1− )([]− )− ( −[])]
+[(1−  − )(− )− ( − )] (6)
subject to the monotonicity constraint
 ≤  ≤  ≤ . (7)
The payments , , , and  are given by (2), (3), (4), and (5).
To solve the simplified problem, note first that it is optimal for the principal
to set  = 1 (since ( − ) ≥ 0). Moreover, it is straightforward to show
that the principal also sets  = 11 Now consider the principal’s choice of 
Note that the coeﬃcient of  is strictly positive if
  ¯() :=  −[]
(1− )( −[]) + (− ) ≈ 032
Thus, the princial sets  = 1 if   ¯() and  = 0 if   ¯().2
Finally consider the choice of . The principal sets  = 1 if the coeﬃcient
of  is strictly positive; i.e. if
  ˜() :=  − 
(1−  − )(− ) = 05
If the coeﬃcient of  is strictly negative, she sets  = 0 while she sets
 ∈ [0 1] if the coeﬃcient of  is equal to zero ( = ˜()).3 Hence, the
solution of the principal’s maximization problem is given by  =  = 1,
 =  = ( − ) + ( − []) + [],  = ( − ) + 
 = ,

⎧
⎨
⎩
= 0 if   ¯()
∈ [0 1] if  = ¯()
= 1 if   ¯()
and
1Specifically, she chooses  = 1 if the coeﬃcient of  is positive. If the coeﬃcient of
 is negative, then due to the monotonicity constraint  ≤  she sets  = 1 whenever
the sum of the coeﬃcient of  and the coeﬃcient of  is positive; i.e. whenever −  
 [(1− )(− ) + ( − )]  Given our example, this condition is always satisfied.
2If the coeﬃcient of  is strictly negative, then due to the monotonicity constraint  ≤
 the principal would generally set  = 1 whenever the sum of the coeﬃcient of  and
the coeﬃcient of  is positive; i.e. whenever   ˆ() := −[](−[])(1−) ≈ 0 43 Obviously,
in our example this condition is more restrictive than the condition   ¯() Hence, in our
example the principal sets  = 0 if the coeﬃcient of  is strictly negative (  ¯()).
Moreover, she sets  ∈ [0 1] if the coeﬃcient of  is equal to zero ( = ¯()).
3Note that the monotonicity constraint  ≤  is always satisfied since in the example
˜  ¯
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
⎧
⎨
⎩
= 0 if   ˜()
∈ [0 1] if  = ˜()
= 1 if   ˜()
It is straightforward to check that the omitted constraints (), (),
(), and () () as well as () are indeed satisfied by the so-
lution.
Consider now the agent’s behavior. Suppose first that in equilibrium the
agent always gathers information, so that  = 1  ˜()  ¯(). Then the
principal sets  =  = 1 such that  =  =  =  =  = 60. If the agent
always gathers information, his expected payoﬀ is given by (− )+(−
)−  = 4, while his expected payoﬀ is  − [] =  − [] = 14 if he does
not gather information. Hence,  = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Suppose next that the agent never gathers information; i.e.  = 0. Then
  ¯() and   ˜(), so that the principal sets  =  = 0 such that
 =  = 0 and  =  = [] = 46 If the agent gathers information, his
expected payoﬀ is ( − )−  = −36, while it is −[] = 0 if he does not
gather information. Hence, we have found the equilibrium: In our example the
agent does not gather information.4
Taken together, if information gathering is unobservable the principal oﬀers
the menu [, , , , , , , ] = [1, 46, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 46]. Given that
the principal will oﬀer this menu, the agent does not gather information such
that the principal extracts the expected first-best surplus, which is 54.
3. Scenario II: Observable information gathering
Suppose first that the principal observes that the agent has not gathered
information. Then at date 2 she oﬀers the contract  = 1,  = [], which
the uninformed agent accepts since his expected production costs are covered.
Thus, the principal obtains the expected first-best surplus  − [], while the
agent’s expected payoﬀ is zero.
Next, suppose that the principal observes that the agent has gathered private
information; i.e. she faces a standard adverse selection problem. Then the
principal oﬀers the menu [, , , , , ] that maximizes her expected
profit [−]+[−]+(1−−)[−] subject to the incentive
4It is immediate to show that there exists no equilibrium in which the agent gathers
information with probability  ∈ (0 1). The agent would do so if and only if his expected
payoﬀ if he gathered information  (( − ) + ( −[]) +[]− ) + ( −
) −  was equal to his expected payoﬀ if he did not gather information ( − ) +
( −[]). Given our example, this is equation cannot be satisfied.
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compatibility constraints
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
 −  ≥  −  ()
and the participation constraints
 −  ≥ 0 ()
 −  ≥ 0 ()
 −  ≥ 0 ()
and the feasibility constraints  ∈ [0 1],  ∈ [0 1], and  ∈ [0 1].
Again we consider our previous example. Observe that the participation
constraint () of the low-cost type is redundant, as it is implied by () and
(). Similarly, the participation constraint () is redundant because it is
implied by () and (). Moreover, note that the incentive compatibility
constraints () and () imply the monotonicity constraint  ≥ .
Similarly, () and () imply  ≥ . Now ignore for a moment the
incentive compatibility constraints (), () and () which will turn
out to be satisfied by our solution. It is then easy to see that () must be
binding; i.e., it is optimal for the principal to set
 =  (8)
because otherwise the principal could increase her expected profit by decreasing
 without violating any of the remaining constraints. Furthermore, ()
must be binding, so that it is optimal for the principal to set
 = ( − ) +  (9)
because otherwise she could decrease  without violating any of the remaining
constraints. Observe that (8) and (9) together with the monotonicity constraint
 ≥  imply that the right-hand side of () is larger than the right-hand
side of (). Thus, it is optimal for the principal to set
 = ( − ) + ( − ) +  (10)
so that () is binding. Hence, the principal’s problem can be simplified. She
chooses  ∈ [0 1],  ∈ [0 1], and  ∈ [0 1] in order to maximize her expected
v
profit
(− )
+[(− )− ( − )]
+[−  − ( + )(− )] (11)
subject to the monotonicity constraint
 ≤  ≤ . (12)
Note first that it is optimal for the principal to set  = 1, since (− ) 
0. Moreover, since ++   holds in the example, the principal also
sets  = 1 Furthermore, it is optimal for the principal to set  = 1 since
−  (+)(−) holds in our example. Hence, if the principal observes
an informed agent, she oﬀers the menu [, , , , , ] = [1, 60, 1, 60,
1, 60] such that her profit is  −  = 40. It is straightforward to check that
the omitted constraints (), () and () are indeed satisfied by the
solution.
Finally, consider the agent’s decision whether to gather information. If the
agent gathers information, the principal oﬀers  =  =  = 60 such that
the agent’s expected rent is  − [] −  = 4. If the agent does not gather
information, the principal oﬀers  = [] such that the agent obtains no rent.
Hence, the agent gathers information.
Taken together, if information gathering is observable, the agent gathers
information and the principal oﬀers [, , , , , ] = [1, 60, 1, 60, 1, 60].
The principal’s profit thus is 40 and the agent’s expected rent is 4.
vi
